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Despite the conclusion of the Uruguay  Round negotiations in  1994 and the 
conversion  during  1995 of  the  GATT  Secretariat  into the  more  influential 
World Trade Organization (WTO), trade tensions between nations remain con- 
siderable. Part of the tension  continues because of social policy differences 
across countries: differences in worker rights and standards, in human rights 
more generally, in technical  standards of production, in natural resource and 
environmental policies, in animal welfare issues, in education and health poli- 
cies, in support for national culture or exclusion of foreign cultural influences, 
and so on. Some countries have sought to use trade policy as a stick or carrot 
to induce other countries to adopt something closer to their social policy stan- 
dards. The United States, for example, routinely does this in its dealings with 
China over human rights. It has also used trade policy with Mexico in pursuit 
of animal welfare (the famous dolphin-tuna case) and with Vietnam in pursuit 
of the interests of U.S. families of missing-in-action soldiers. 
Apparently, social policy differences are becoming more important in dis- 
putes between countries. Why? Under what circumstances (if any) is trade pol- 
icy an appropriate instrument for resolving such disputes? What are the impli- 
cations for the global trading system, for regional trading arrangements, and 
for their interaction? What if anything should East Asian countries and perhaps 
APEC do about this development? These questions are addressed in this paper 
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by focusing mainly on environmental issues and trade, since their entwining in 
policy circles is arguably the most controversial and the matter is already on 
the WTO’s work agenda. Some discussion of  the trade and labor standards 
issue also is included in the paper, partly because it parallels the trade/environ- 
ment debate to some extent, partly because the United States and France would 
like to see it added to the WTO’s agenda, and partly because it is already in- 
cluded in some major regional trade agreements. In fact, both issues arose in a 
significant way  in the NAFTA  negotiations of  the early 1990s, to the point 
where it appeared the US. Congress was not willing to ratify that agreement 
without accompanying supplemental agreements on environmental and labor 
standards. Since the 1950s these issues also have been part of Western Euro- 
pean integration negotiations, most recently with  heated debate among EU 
member governments at Maastricht over a “social charter” relating to labor 
standards  . 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1 looks at why social policies 
in general are becoming subjected to more international scrutiny, both region- 
ally and globally. Section 3.2 then asks why environmental issues in particular 
are becoming more entwined with trade policy. Section 3.3 examines the rela- 
tionship between economic growth, trade, and the environment. Section 3.4 
discusses the nature and extent of  entwining of  GATT and the environment. 
This is followed, in section 3.5, by  some speculation on what lies ahead for 
the WTO in its relationship with existing and prospective multilateral environ- 
mental agreements. Section 3.6 is devoted to discussing GA’ITNTO and labor 
standards, showing why their entwining has become an issue in the mid-1990s 
and how in some (but by  no means all) respects the issue of  trade and labor 
standards is similar to the trade/environment issue. Both issues have a distinct 
North-South dimension, which  is  why  developing countries are becoming 
more concerned about them. The final section of the paper focuses on what 
developing countries and APEC could do in response to these developments. 
3.1  Why Social Policies Are Coming under Closer 
International Scrutiny 
Social policy differences across countries are to be expected. Partly they 
reflect per capita income differences: as communities become richer, so does 
their demand for social policies and higher standards. Policy differences exist 
also because of differences in tastes and preferences. Indeed, one of  the key 
reasons for nationhood is to bring together and distinguish one grouping of 
people whose preferences are more similar to each other than to those of neigh- 
boring groups (Alesina and Spolaore 1995). In the case of environmental poli- 
cies, they also reflect differences in per capita endowments of natural resources 
and environmental amenities. A diversity of  social policies therefore contri- 
butes to differences in countries’ comparative advantages in trade and therefore 
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As economic integration proceeds, though, pressure increases to reduce dif- 
ferences in social policies that have economic consequences. This has clearly 
happened within countries in the course of  their economic development: nu- 
merous local, state, or provincial policies and standards have gradually been 
replaced  by  national  standards and conformance assessment  (National Re- 
search Council 1995). The motivation is not just to reduce administrative and 
conformance costs. It also results from concerns in high-standards regions that 
costs of production for some firms and industries are higher in their region than 
in regions with lower standards, causing them to be less competitive. These 
differences become ever more important as traditional barriers to trade and 
investment between regions fall (notably transport and communication costs). 
Harmonization of those standards could go in either direction, however, with 
winners and losers in each region trying to influence the outcome. And there 
is no reason to presume that overall national economic and social welfare will 
improve because of those social policies’ being harmonized: it all depends on 
how close the most influential groups’ standards are to those of the median 
voter. 
Similar forces to those intranational ones are also at work in the international 
arena. There have been substantial reductions in recent decades in traditional 
barriers to foreign import competition, including international transport and 
communication costs, tariffs, and other governmental border policies that in- 
hibit flows of  goods, services, and capital across national borders.’ The re- 
sulting extra exposure of national economies to competition from abroad-in 
part due to the very success of the GATT in promoting trade liberalization- 
has caused attention to focus more sharply on domestic policies, including 
cost-raising social policies and standards, that continue to reduce the interna- 
tional competitiveness of some firms and industries in each country (Bhagwati 
1996). These harmed producers are especially likely to protest when signifi- 
cant new players with lower standards become competitors. This has happened 
increasingly  during the past quarter-century, first with the growth of Asia’s 
newly industrialized economies and then with the opening-up of  China and 
numerous other transitional and developing countries. 
It has been suggested that one of the driving forces behind regional integra- 
tion initiatives has been the tardiness of the GATT in taking up social policy 
issues among its large and diverse group of  contracting  parties  (Lawrence 
1995). Achieving agreement to harmonize social policies and otherwise coor- 
dinate trade- and investment-related domestic policy reforms is easier the more 
1. These reductions are reflected in the fact that the volume of  merchandise trade has been 
growing nearly twice as fast as the volume of merchandise output globally (3.9 compared with 
2.1 percent per year during  1980-92),  and trade in commercial services has grown even faster 
(raising its share of global exports of goods and commercial services from 17 to 21 percent during 
1980-92-see  GATT  1994). Direct foreign investment, meanwhile, has grown nearly twice as 
fast as international trade globally over the past decade or so, following the deregulation of many 
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similar are the per capita incomes, tastes, and preferences of the countries con- 
cerned. Hence, we observe the formation of trade blocs more among similar 
than among disparate economies. We  also observe the inclusion of  social in 
addition  to  trade policies more  in  integration agreements involving richer 
countries than in those between poorer countries, presumably because (1) the 
demand for social policies is income elastic and (2)  barriers to trade and invest- 
ment flows (both natural and governmental)  between countries tend to be lower 
among  rich  countries than  between  them  and  poorer  countries or  among 
poorer countries. 
When dissimilar countries have sought to join such blocs (e.g., Mediten-a- 
neans to the European Community, Mexico to NAFTA), advocates for higher 
standards have endeavored to tie market access to the upward harmonization 
of social policies. To a considerable extent they have succeeded in doing so in 
the European Union. And in the case of  NAFTA  they  were also successful 
after President Clinton came into office, to the extent that side agreements on 
environmental and labor standards were added to NAFTA in the closing hours 
of the negotiations. 
As for trade outside these blocs, we tend to observe advocates for high stan- 
dards supporting import restrictions on like products from lower-standard 
countries. Why? Because such restrictions simultaneously reduce opposition 
by  local firms to the raising of  standards at home and increase the incentive 
for foreign firms and their governments to adopt higher standards abroad (out 
of  fear of  losing market access). However, such uses of trade policy are both 
discriminatory and protectionist. That brings advocates for higher standards 
both into direct conflict with supporters of liberal world trade and into coalition 
with traditional protectionist interests. Fear of  the latter’s gaining superficial 
respectability in arguing against trade liberalization has led to claims that “so- 
cial correctness” is becoming the New Protectionism (Steil 1994). 
3.2  Why Environmental Issues Are Becoming More Entwined with 
Trade Policy 
The list of environmental concerns with international or global dimensions 
has grown rapidly in recent years. In addition to worries about air, water, soil, 
and visual pollution at the local, national, and regional2 levels, some of  that 
pollution is believed to be also damaging the environment on a global scale, 
for example through ozone depletion and climate change. Some in rich coun- 
tries  are concerned that  these problems will  be  exacerbated as  economic 
growth takes off  in newly industrialized countries with laxer environmental 
standards. More and more people worry also about resource depletion, species 
2. Transborder pollution issues affecting adjoining countries of a region are not discussed in 
what follows since they are usually resolved by  intergovernmental agreement without having to 
resort to trade policy measures, the free-rider problem being absent because of the small number 
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extinction, and animal welfare at the global level, regardless of national bound- 
aries. Ongoing integration of the world economy also brings with it new health 
and safety concerns by consumers of imported products. Needless to say, per- 
sonal values play an important role in debates on these issues. Hence, there is 
considerable scope for friction between countries with different preferences, 
resource endowments, incomes, and knowledge about how different activities 
and policies affect the environment, and therefore different perceptions of opti- 
mal national and global environmental and resource policies. 
Fluctuate though they might with the business cycle, these heightened con- 
cerns about resource depletion and the environment are likely to keep growing. 
One reason is that, even though uncertainties remain, the scientific basis for 
many of these concerns is perceived to be more solid now than was the case 
20 years ago. Another is that both the world‘s population and its real per capita 
income continue to increase at very high rates by historical standards. Unfortu- 
nately, though, the supplies of most natural resources and environmental ser- 
vices are limited, and markets for many  of  them are incomplete or ab~ent.~ 
Markets are underdeveloped because of  disputed, ambiguous, or nonexistent 
property rights or because of the high cost of enforcing those rights. 
It is true that the more advanced economies have  established institutional 
structures to help handle the tasks of arriving at a social consensus on what are 
appropriate environmental or sustainable development policies for that society, 
of  allocating property rights, and of  enforcing policies. The same is true in 
some traditional societies before they begin to “modernize” and their resources 
come under pressure because of declining mortality rates. But it is less true in 
the newly “modernizing” economies, where the world’s population and con- 
sumption growth are expected to be concentrated for the foreseeable future. 
And, at the multilateral level, cooperative intergovernmental mechanisms in 
the environmental area have only recently begun to be formed and will take 
some time before they become very effective, especially where free-rider prob- 
lems are rife. 
So, with sufficient forums yet to be fully developed for multilateral environ- 
mental dialogue, and with the problems increasingly being perceived as urgent 
as new scientific evidence becomes available, there is growing interest among 
environmental groups-especially  in the more advanced economies-in  using 
one of the few policy instruments apparently available to their governments, 
3. This does not apply equally to all natural resources and environmental services, of course. 
The doomsdayers such as Meadows et al. (1972) have been shown to be  spectacularly wrong in 
predicting the exhaustion of minerals and energy raw materials, e.g., because they have failed to 
take into account economic feedback mechanisms. Beckerrnan (1992) noted that the cumulative 
world consumption of many minerals during the past quarter-century exceeded “known reserves” 
at the beginning of the period, yet today’s revised “known reserves” nevertheless exceed those of 
25 years ago! The same cannot be said for tropical hardwoods and some fish species, however, 
although in these cases there is scope to move further from the current “hunter-gatherer” technol- 
ogy to using land or water more intensively in planting trees for timber or practicing aquaculture 
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namely trade restrictions, to influence environmental outcomes both at home 
and abroad. 
Environmental groups perceive trade policy as a means both of raising na- 
tional environmental standards at home and abroad and of inducing countries 
to become signatories to and abide by international environmental agreements. 
On the first, these groups are aware that, unless compensated, firms will oppose 
the raising of  domestic standards if competitors abroad are not subjected to 
similar cost increases. But since the loss of competitiveness can be offset by 
import restrictions  on products from lower-standard  countries, such restric- 
tions can at the same time remove opposition by local firms to higher standards 
at home and increase the incentive for foreign firms and their governments to 
adopt higher standards abroad. Not surprisingly, those features make trade pol- 
icy very attractive to environmentalists. 
On the second, with respect to international  environmental agreements, a 
major attraction of trade measures is that they can be used effectively as sticks 
or  carrots  because  they  are  relatively  easy  to  use  and  are  immediate  in 
their impact. Even the threat of  trade  sanctions can have a rapid  and per- 
suasive effect in encouraging a country to join an international environmental 
agreement and subsequently to abide by its rules. 
Already we have seen the use of discriminatory trade restrictions affecting 
particular  targeted products (e.g., in the Montreal Protocol on CFCs-sub- 
stances that deplete the ozone layer). There have also been proposals to use 
trade sanctions against unrelated  products. These aim chiefly at persuading 
developing countries to adopt stricter environmental standards (e.g., threats to 
provide less open access to textile and other markets in industrial countries 
unless logging is curtailed or managed on a more sustainable basis). 
3.3  The Relationships between Economic Growth, Trade, and 
the Environment 
The standard theory of changing comparative advantages in a growing world 
economy, which has been developed without consideration of environmental 
concerns, can readily be modified to incorporate at least some of those con- 
cerns. As espoused by Krueger (1977) and Learner (1987), this theory suggests 
that when a developing country  opens up to international  trade, its exports 
initially will be specialized in primary products. This is because its stocks of 
produced capital relative to natural resources are comparatively low. Should 
those nonnatural capital stocks per worker (including human skills) expand 
more for this country than globally, the country’s comparative advantage will 
gradually shift to more capital- and skill-intensive activities (particularly man- 
ufactures and services). If such countries are relatively land abundant, some of 
that produced capital and new or newly imported capital-intensive technology 
may be employed profitably to extract minerals or farm the land. But in most 
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sectors and shift these countries’ comparative advantage away  from primary 
products.  Thus  countries that  are  lacking in  natural  resources  or  that  are 
densely populated  will tend to industrialize at an earlier stage of  economic 
development, and their nonprimary exports will tend to be more intensive in 
the use of unskilled  labor initially. In the case of manufactures,  the process 
of upgrading to more capital-intensive production  over time leaves room in 
international  markets  for later-industrializing  countries also  to  begin  with 
labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing. 
If  national boundaries were such that there were no international environ- 
mental spillovers, and there were no global commons, this story need be com- 
plicated only slightly to incorporate nonmarketed environmental services and 
pollution by-products. The complication required is simply to allow for the 
fact that as a country’s per capita income and industrial output grow, the value 
its citizens place on the environment increases and with it their demands for 
proper valuation of  resource depletion and environmental degradation, for the 
assigning and better policing of property rights, and for the implementation of 
costly domestic pollution abatement policies that may induce the production 
and dissemination of less-pollutive technologies-at  least after certain thresh- 
old levels of income or pollution are reached? Beyond those threshold points 
the severity of such abatement policies is likely to be positively correlated with 
per capita income, with population  density, and with the degree of  urban- 
ization. 
If all economies were growing equally rapidly, the progressive introduction 
of national environmental taxes and regulations would tend to cause pollution- 
intensive production processes to gradually relocate from wealthier or more 
densely populated countries to developing or more sparsely populated coun- 
tries.5  They would also slow or reverse the growth in the quantity demanded of 
products whose consumption is pollutive, and more so in wealthier or more 
densely populated countries, where taxes on such products would tend to be 
highest. If the more advanced economies are net importers (net exporters) of 
products whose production (consumption) is pollutive, these countries’ opti- 
mal environmental policies would worsen their terms of trade to the benefit of 
poorer economies, and conversely (Siebert et al. 1980;  Anderson 1992b). Thus 
4. Recent papers reporting evidence in support of the claim that the demand for implementing 
and enforcing pollution abatement policies is income elastic include Radetzki (1992). Grossman 
and Krueger (1993, 1995), Seldon and Song (1994), and Grossman (1995). See also Deacon and 
Shapiro (1975) on the correlation between income levels and voter attitudes toward environmental 
priorities. Studies aimed at explaining this transition (sometimes called an environmental Kuznets 
curve) are now beginning to emerge. Beltratti (1995) has sought to explain it in terms of transi- 
tional dynamics of endogenous growth models, while Jones and Manuelli (1995) have provided a 
positive political economy model. 
5.  The term “pollution-intensive production processes” should be broadly interpreted to include 
activities such as mining in pristine areas or leisure services that may attract undesired local or 
international tourists. The presumption is that industries are not affected equally by the progressive 
raising of environmental standards and charges, for otherwise there would be little change in the 
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even countries without (or with unchanged) environmental policies will be af- 
fected through foreign trade and investment by the development of environ- 
mental policies  that accompany  growth in other economiesP The extent of 
international relocation of productive activities due to the raising and enforce- 
ment of environmental standards should not be exaggerated, however. Recent 
studies suggest the effect of such policies on comparative costs may be quite 
minor.’ 
The story becomes more complicated, however, when account is taken of 
policy reactions to international  environmental problems  such as the global 
commons, species depletion, or animal rights. The ban on ivory trade under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) provides 
an extreme example: the strong comparative advantage that southern African 
nations had in elephant products virtually disappeared when the ban was intro- 
duced in 1989. Another is the recent ban, adopted under the Base1 Convention 
relating  to hazardous waste,  on exports of  so-called  hazardous  recyclables 
from industrial to developing countries: that ban threatens the growth pros- 
pects for recycling industries in developing countries. A third example is the 
proposed limitation on imports into some high-income  countries of tropical 
hardwoods, the aim of which is to discourage deforestation. An import ban of 
this kind would reduce export growth in logs and perhaps sawn timber in those 
developing countries still well endowed with hardwood forests, while improv- 
ing the terms of trade of other net importers of hardwood such as Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan. In  addition,  the Montreal Protocol on phasing  out  the use  of 
ozone-depleting CFCs incorporates discriminatory trade provisions designed 
to limit the relocation from signatory to nonsignatory countries of industries 
producing or using CFCs, as well as to encourage nonsignatories to accede to 
the protocoL8  And there is the infamous example of the U.S. ban on the impor- 
tation  of  Mexican  tuna, which  U.S.  authorities  deem to have been  caught 
in  dolphin-unfriendly nets:  domestic U.S. regulations  affecting the  use  of 
dolphin-unfriendly  nets  on  U.S.  registered  fishing vessels,  if  implemented 
alone, would have boosted Mexican competitiveness in tuna fishing, but the 
subsequent ban on tuna imports instead reduced it. As is clear in the latter 
6. Similarly, if as they grow economics were to institutionally shorten working hours per week, 
raise wages for time worked outside those hours, or otherwise increase the cost of labor time 
in attempting to raise labor standards, that would speed the transformation of those economies’ 
comparative advantages away from labor-intensive activities. If  those institutional changes  af- 
fected mainly unskilled labor, the competitiveness of less developed economies in unskilled-labor- 
intensive products would strengthen even faster-see  section 3.6 below. 
7. See, e.g., Leonard (1988). Low (1992), and Jaffe et al. (1995). As well, Tobey (1990) found 
little evidence of actual changes in patterns of trade specialization in response to the imposition 
of environmental regulations since the 1960s. However, as noted by  Hoekman and Leidy (1992), 
changes in trade patterns may be absent because import barriers were raised to offset any decline 
in the competitiveness of affected industries. 
8.  For details of  the Montreal  Protocol,  see, e.g., Benedick  (1991) and Enders and Porges 
(1992). A list of the other major international environmental agreements with trade provisions is 
provided in GATT (1992, app. 1) and Esty (1994, app. D). 65  Social Policy Dimensions of Economic Integration 
two examples, the motive for trade policy action is often a mixture of national 
competitiveness  concerns  and  concerns-especially  in  wealthier  countries 
(typically  not  shared to  the  same extent by  developing  countries)-for  the 
global commons and for animal welfare. 
Two facts therefore need to be recognized. The first is that there are im- 
portant international environmental spillovers beyond the simple transborder 
ones that can be handled  through negotiations between  governments  of af- 
fected neighboring countries. Those spillovers are of two sorts: in addition to 
the physical damage our activities can do to the global environment regardless 
of the location on the globe of those activities, there are-for  want of a better 
tern-psychological  spillovers as well. For example, I may grieve if another 
country’s activities threaten a particular animal or plant species in its jurisdic- 
tion. Or I may grieve if  I believe your desires for higher environmental stan- 
dards in your country are not being recognized sufficiently by your national 
government (a political market failure). Controversial though such views are,9 
many people perceive a need for multilateral action to reduce these spillover 
problems, and that is where trade policy  measures enter the debate: they are 
seen by  environmentalists  as providing  powerful  carrots  and  sticks  for  at- 
tracting signatories and penalizing  nonsignatories to bilateral or multilateral 
environmental agreements, as well as for encouraging other countries to adopt 
better national environmental policies for the sake of their own citizens and en- 
vironment. 
The other fact that needs to be recognized is that one country’s environmen- 
tal policy choice is not independent of the choices of other countries. Why? 
Because the imposition of higher standards or pollution charges at home alters 
the international competitiveness of  industries, in particular by  harming the 
more pollution-intensive  industries. If their competitors abroad were not sub- 
jected to similar cost-raising policies, such industries would lobby against the 
imposition of higher  standards at home. And  while it is true that the less- 
pollutive  industries at home would benefit from higher environmental stan- 
dards, they are more diffuse and so are not likely to add much support to the 
environmentalists’ lobbying. 
It was because of this latter fact that trade policy first entered the environ- 
mental picture, back in  the latter  1960s when the first wave of widespread 
concern for the environment began in industrial countries. As already men- 
tioned, environmental groups perceived that, since the loss of competitiveness 
of pollution-intensive industries could be offset by restrictions on imports from 
9. Some would argue that psychological spillovers are less worthy of consideration than physical 
spillovers, not least because they are less measurable and hence less “objective.” Hence, the scope 
for traditional protectionists to “capture” environmentalists concerned with psychological spillo- 
vers is considerable. Others would counter that there is so much uncertainty about the extent and 
effects of physical spillovers that they too are subjective and hence are qualitatively no different 
from psychological spillovers. Both exist in people’s minds, and there is no reason a priori to 
presume that one is more important than the other in some “willingness-to-pay” or popularity 
sense. 66  Kym Anderson 
lower-standard countries, such restrictions could at the same time reduce oppo- 
sition by such industries to higher standards at home and increase the incentive 
for foreign firms and their governments to adopt higher standards abroad to 
avoid being subjected to anti “eco-dumping” duties. 
The demand for unilateral use of trade policy for this latter reason has grown 
over time with the internationalization of  the global economy, in two ways. 
One is that, with the decline in traditional trade barriers (tariffs, transport and 
communication costs, etc.  j, any given environmental charge is becoming rela- 
tively more important as a determinant of international competitiveness,  ceteris 
paribus. And the other is that, with the deregulation of  financial markets and 
direct foreign investment of the 1980s, the possibilities for firms to disinvest in 
high-standard countries and relocate their factories in lower-standard countries 
(“pollution havens”) have increased markedly. Environmental groups fear this 
will result in governments’ delaying the introduction or enforcement of  envi- 
ronmental policies-and  possibly even lowering standards in a “race to the 
bottom”-in  their attempts to attract or retain investments and hence jobs. 
Both types of  environmental uses of trade policy-unilaterally,  and to in- 
crease the workability of multilateral environmental agreements-raise  poten- 
tial conflicts of interest between rich and poorer countries; and the fact that 
discriminatory trade measures are increasingly being used to achieve the envi- 
ronmental objectives of rich countries, without regard to legitimate economic 
development concerns of poorer countries, increases the likelihood of environ- 
ment-related trade disputes. There is even dispute over what constitutes the 
global commons: some would argue that a country or region should not have 
to bow to international pressure to preserve endangered species in its territory 
(or at least not without adequate compensation), while others would argue that 
such countries are merely the custodians of those resources for the benefit of 
humankind generally. 
The increasing use of discriminatory trade measures to address environmen- 
tal issues should concern the world at large, and developing countries in partic- 
ular, for at least four reasons. First, trade policy measures typically will not be 
the first-best instruments for achieving environmental objectives. This is be- 
cause trade sanctions or the threat of trade sanctions do not directly affect the 
root cause of the environmental problem. Their use in place of  more efficient 
instruments reduces unnecessarily the level and growth of  global economic 
welfare as conventionally measured and may even add to rather than reduce 
global environmental degradation and resource depletion.  lo 
10. The ban on ivory trade again provides a case in point. By lowering the value of elephant 
products, the ban  reduces the incentive for rural Africans to tolerate elephants trampling their 
crops and so ultimately could result in more rather than less culling of elephants in some areas. In 
other areas, the ivory trade ban has reduced the value of  the animal so much that it is no longer 
profitable to cull the herd. An unfortunate consequence is that bushland in national parks is being 
decimated by the increased number of  elephants, which is of  course endangering other species 
(Barbier et al. 1990). 
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The second reason for concern is that producer interest groups and some 
environmental groups are nevertheless finding it mutually advantageous to use 
environmental arguments in support of their claims for unilateral import re- 
strictions, particularly following the costly imposition of stricter environmen- 
tal standards on domestic producers."  In this sense, the environment can pro- 
vide a convenient additional excuse for raising trade barriers-and  one that 
is socially respectable.  Unfortunately, such protectionist  action reduces real 
incomes not just at home but elsewhere too, especially in developing and 
natural-resource-abundant countries. 
Third, insofar as this can lead to an escalation in trade disputes-as  is al- 
most inevitable, especially given the North-South dimension involved and the 
fact that environmental uses of trade policy are inherently discriminatory-it 
could be followed by  retaliatory and counterretaliatory action, the end result 
of which would be an undermining of the rules-based open global trading sys- 
tem on which the dynamism of developing economies continues to depend. 
And the fourth reason to be concerned is that there is another important 
sense in which aspects of environmentalism are putting at risk the global trad- 
ing system. It is that, in addition to proposing  the use of trade restrictions, 
some environmentalists also oppose trade and investment liberalization. They 
oppose the GATT's attempts to reduce barriers on at least two grounds: that 
freer trade means more output and income, which they presume means more 
resource depletion and degradation of the natural environment; and that freer 
trade and investment encourages the relocation of environmentally degrading 
industries to countries with lower environmental protection standards or more 
fragile natural environments and leads to greater transportation activity, which 
contributes to further environmental damage. 
Neither of  these assertions is unambiguously  supported by empirical evi- 
dence, however. The first, that income increases mean greater damage to the 
natural environment, may be true initially for some poorer countries (in which 
case any additional environmental damage has to be weighed against the mar- 
ginal economic benefits of higher incomes for poor people), but once middle- 
income status is reached people tend to alter their behavior in ways that reduce 
pressures on the environment. A key change is in family size: higher incomes 
lead in time to lower population growth rates (Baldwin 1995).  This, along with 
the increased employment opportunities resulting from trade liberalization, is 
likely to have a major effect in reducing the rate of environmental degradation 
~~~ 
pean  import bans on tropical hardwood logs (together with tariff escalation on timber product 
imports) has encouraged Indonesia to ban log exports. But since felling has been allowed to con- 
tinue, this policy has lowered the domestic price of logs and thereby raised effective assistance to 
Indonesia's furniture and other timber-using industries to extremely high levels (GATT 1991, 127). 
At that lower log price and with possibly lower-quality sawmilling techniques it is not surprising 
that less of each tree is now used, leading possibly to nearly as many trees being felled as before 
the log export ban. 
1  I. See the discussions in Hillman and Ursprung (1992)  and Hoekman and Leidy (1992),  as well 
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due to population pressures in developing countries. In rural areas it means 
fewer people denuding hillsides to eke out a subsistence income, while in ur- 
ban areas it means fewer un- or underemployed squatters in shanty towns with 
poor sanitation and water. 
Another common behavioral change as economies open up and incomes rise 
is that the demand for education expands, and with more income and education 
comes more skillful management of all resources, including the environment, 
and more forceful demands on governments to improve the establishment and 
policing of private property rights and of more stringent environmental policies 
(see n. 4 above). As well, the political cost of implementing such policy re- 
forms tends to fall because of increased opportunities for businesses to meet 
stricter standards by acquiring more and cheaper environmentally benign pro- 
duction processes and products from abroad. One might therefore expect that 
as trade and investment liberalization leads to upward convergence in incomes 
around the world, there would be an upward harmonization of environmental 
standards (Casella  1996). That realization points to the inappropriateness of 
the blanket call by some environmental groups for trade liberalization to follow 
the upward harmonization of standards, since liberalization may in fact induce 
harmonization. 
And third,  the increase in the value of  poor people’s time  in developing 
countries will alter household activities in another way that is especially im- 
portant for the environment. It is that the relative price of wood (in terms of 
time spent gathering it) as a source of household fuel rises. Since about three- 
quarters of the timber harvested in developing countries is used as household 
fuel, this change could have a major beneficial impact in reducing deforestation 
and CO, levels. 
The other major assertion by environmentalists, that the global environment 
is necessarily harmed by the relocation of production following trade and in- 
vestment liberalization, also is questionable. We know from the law of compar- 
ative advantage that not all industries will be relocated from rich to poor coun- 
tries when the former’s trade barriers are lowered: some industries in the North 
will expand at the expense of those industries in the South, and conversely. In 
any case, it should not simply be assumed that relocating some production to 
the South necessarily worsens the environment. Recent preliminary examina- 
tions of the likely environmental effects of reducing government assistance to 
two of the North’s most protected industries, coal and food, reveal that in both 
cases the global environment may  well be improved by  trade liberalization, 
especially if  complementary environmental policies are in  place (Anderson 
1992a; Steenblik and Coroyannakis 1995). Nor need the risk of environmental 
damage from transport activity increase with trade reform. The lowering of 
import barriers to processed primary products, for example, would allow more 
raw materials to be processed in resource-rich countries, so reducing the bulki- 
ness of  shipments. But, evidently, many more empirical studies will be re- 
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and  publicity  against  multilateral  trade  reform  as an  environmentally  un- 
friendly activity. 
3.4  The GATT/WTO and the Environment 
How “green” are the rules of  the GATT and how have they been adapted 
over time?I2 From the outset the GATT has been a conservationist institution 
in the sense that its purpose has been to reduce trade barriers and thereby the 
inefficiency in the use of the world‘s resources. 
The heart of the GATT, agreed to by 23 original contracting parties in 1947 
and since then by another 100 or so countries, is the nondiscrimination require- 
ments of Articles 1 and 3. These oblige parties to treat imports from any GATT 
contracting  party  no less favorably than  other imports (the “most-favored- 
nation” requirement) and no less favorably, after border taxes are paid, than 
similar domestic products (the “national treatment” requirement). 
Article 20 provides exceptions to these general rules, however, including 
provisions for some environmental regulations. Specifically, parts (b) and (g) 
of Article 20 allow trade restrictions “necessary to protect human, animal, or 
plant life or health” and “relating to the conservation of  exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption,” subject to the requirement that such 
restrictions “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary  or unjustifiable discrimination  between  countries where the  same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” The latter 
has been interpreted to mean that the measure must be primarily for a conser- 
vation purpose (rather than for a mixture of motives) and must be necessary in 
the sense of being the least GATT-inconsistent measure available. These provi- 
sos have ensured that Article 20 has been rather narrowly interpreted, which is 
partly why some environmental groups have felt further greening of the GATT 
is required (Charnovitz 1991; Esty  1994). But there is nothing in the GATT 
that prevents a country from adopting production or consumption measures to 
offset environmental externalities associated with either of those sets of activi- 
ties. And since trade itself is almost never claimed to be the root cause of an 
environmental problem, supporters of the institution see little need to consider 
trade measures as part of the solution to those problems. 
As already mentioned, widespread public interest in trade and environmen- 
tal issues first surfaced in rich countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At 
that time concern focused mainly on industrial pollution within and between 
neighboring  advanced economies. The foreign trade  and investment issues 
raised at that time were centered on how the imposition of pollution standards 
at home that were stricter than those abroad might damage the international 
12. For detailed  legal assessments, see, e.g., Farber  and Hudec  (1996). Hudec (1996), and 
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competitiveness of  the home country’s firms and how to avoid such damage 
through border protection measures. 
Where the environmental damage caused by production is purely local, the 
calls by  disadvantaged  firms for trade restrictions  or subsidies to offset the 
decline in their international  competitiveness,  because  standards have been 
raised, has no economic logic: such assistance would tend to offset the desired 
effect of limiting by-product p01lution.I~  Nor is it reasonable to conclude that 
other countries are engaging in eco-dumping if  the imports they are able to 
supply are produced with laxer environmental standards, if those lower stan- 
dards are consistent with the preferences and natural resource endowments of 
those  exporting  countries  (e.g.,  because  those  countries  are poorer  or less 
densely populated and less urbanized). Even so, claims for protection against 
eco-dumping have political appeal and may result in higher import barriers or 
export subsidies than  would  otherwise be the case in  advanced economies. 
Leading up to the UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stock- 
holm in June 1972, the GATT Secretariat produced  a background paper on 
those issues (GATT 1971),  and a Working Group on Environmental Measures 
and International Trade  was  established.  But  no  significant  changes  to the 
GATT occurred during the Tokyo Round as a result of  the expression of these 
concerns, and it was two decades before the working group met for the first 
time. 
Trade policy actions are more likely to occur, and to be more difficult to 
dismiss as inappropriate, when environmentalists in such countries view par- 
ticular damage to the environment as unacceptable regardless of’the nation in 
which  the  damage occurs. This case is even more problematic if the damage is 
not just psychological (as with animal rights) but also physical, for then the 
relocation of production to a country with laxer environmental standards may 
worsen animal welfare, or the environment at home, in addition to reducing 
the profitability of the home firms. The U.S.-Mexican  dispute over the use of 
dolphin-unfriendly nets by tuna fishermen again comes to mind, In that case 
the GATT ruled against the U.S. ban on imports of tuna from Mexico, partly 
because  the  ban  did  not  discriminate  according  to which  type  of  net  was 
used-as  it cannot, because an aspect of the production process rather than the 
final traded product itself is what is considered objectionable. The GATT panel 
ruled against the ban because to do otherwise would have created a huge loop- 
hole in the GATT for any country unilaterally  to apply trade restrictions as a 
means  of  imposing  its environmental  standards on other countries.  Such a 
loophole would work against the main objective of the multilateral trading sys- 
tem, which is to provide stable and predictable nondiscriminatory market ac- 
13. See, e.g., Baumol (1971), Siebert (1974), and Walter (1975, 1976). Such protection from 
import competition cannot be justified on economic efficiency grounds (nor for that matter on 
environmental grounds), because the environmental policy is aiming to eliminate an unjustifiable 
(implicit) subsidy arising through undervaluation of environmental resources, rather than to add 
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cess opportunities through agreed rules and disciplines and bound tariffs on 
imports. 
Following a lull in interest brought on by the economic disruptions of the 
1973-82  oil shock period, the current wave of public concern for the natural 
environment, leading up to and following the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) held in Brazil in June 1992, is much more intense, 
more widespread, and more likely to be sustained and to affect a much broader 
range  of  countries than was the case prior to the latter 1980s. The Uruguay 
Round agenda was set by  1986, before the current wave had built up, so the 
trade/environment issue was not a separate item for negotiation. Nor was there 
an environmental impact assessment of the Round as a whole. However, the 
Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade that was 
formed in 1971 was activated for the first time in 1991 and has met frequently 
since then. As well, several of the Uruguay Round agreements contain provis- 
ions  that  relate  to  the  environment  and  build  on  articles  in  the  General 
Agreement. 
The most fundamental  provision  in the Round is in the preamble  to the 
agreement to establish the WTO, which refers to the WTO’s objective as en- 
abling all contracting parties the maximum opportunities for “expanding the 
production  and trade  in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal 
use of the world‘s  resources in accordance with the objective of  sustainable 
development,  seeking both  to protect and preserve  the environment and en- 
hance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.” To give initial ef- 
fect to that, a decision was taken on trade and environment by ministers meet- 
ing in Marrakesh in April  1994 to sign the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. 
They agreed to establish a Committee on Trade and Environment to report to 
the first biennial meeting of ministers (probably in late 1996). The other main 
features of the Uruguay Round agreements with environmental provisions re- 
late to technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and the 
agreements on subsidies and countervailing duties and on trade-related intel- 
lectual property rights. Overall, the trade liberalization to result from the Uru- 
guay Round is likely to conserve resources and reduce environmental degrada- 
tion rather than be unfriendly to the natural environment (see Anderson 1995 
for details). 
3.5  The GATTNTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
The other way  in which trade policy is being called upon to help achieve 
environmental objectives has, as mentioned above, more validity. It is as a car- 
rot or stick to entice countries to sign and abide by multilateral environmental 
agreements. In the case of combating global environmental problems such as 
ozone depletion or climate change, the free-rider problem arises. One of the 
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problem is to write trade provisions into the agreement, as was done in the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on reducing the use of CFCs and halons to slow ozone 
depletion. To date, no GATT contracting party has formally objected to that 
use of trade policy. Nor have they to the bans on trade in ivory and rhino horn 
and tiger products that are part of the CITES or to the trade provisions in the 
Base1 Convention on trade in hazardous wastes. Conflicts may well arise in the 
future, however, if trade provisions are drafted into more contentious multilat- 
eral environmental agreements (e.g., to impose a global carbon tax). That is 
why this matter figures importantly on the agenda of the new WTO Committee 
on Trade and Environment. Discussions so far in the GATTNTO have cen- 
tered on the idea of providing waivers on a case-by-case basis or, alternatively, 
of  providing  an  “environmental window”  for  multilateral  environmental 
agreements within the GATT exceptions clause (Article 20). 
To help assess the appropriate role for trade policy in multilateral environ- 
mental agreements, it is helpful to recall that supporters of trade liberalization 
and of environmental protection share a common goal: to improve social wel- 
fare. They also share a common problem: the need to foster multilateral coop- 
eration to fully achieve that objective, because in each sphere (the economy 
and the environment) there is considerable and increasing interdependence 
among nations. But the two groups differ in the important respect that support- 
ers of liberal world trade have understood its virtues for two centuries and have 
been active for more than 50 years in building institutions such as the GATT 
and WTO to help achieve their goal, whereas widespread concerns about the 
environment are relatively new and supporters of environmental protection en- 
tered only recently as significant players in international policy arenas. 
Understandably, supporters of liberal trade and the GATTNTO resent the 
encroachment of these “new kids on the block” on what they perceive as their 
hard-won territory, especially when they genuinely believe that reducing trade 
barriers is likely to be environmentally  friendly and consistent with sustainable 
development in the long run in the sense that it allows the world to use its 
resources more efficiently.I4  Equally, advocates for greater environmental pro- 
tection are frustrated that international agreements as important as those re- 
sulting from the GATT’s recent Uruguay Round can be implemented without 
being subject to environmental impact assessments or environmental safe- 
guards. 
Clearly, there is scope for greater understanding and altered strategies on 
both sides. More than that, there is the distinct possibility that, by  working 
14. See the literature review in, e.g., Ulph (1994). Liberal traders should acknowledge, however, 
that opening up to trade can lead to overexploitation of common property resources (e.g., via 
deforestation  of  tropical  forests) in  the  absence  of  adequate  property  rights,  environmental 
charges, or policing, in which case there may be a second-best case for restricting trade until those 
problems are resolved (Chichilnisky 1994). In such cases all other distortions or market failures 
need to be corrected at the same time as trade is being liberalized in order to achieve unequivocal 
global welfare improvement. Even then, theory tells us that some countries may be made worse 
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together, both groups’ objectives will be further enhanced-a  “win-win” out- 
come. Some observers believe that it may ultimately require a World Environ- 
ment Organization (WEO) to set rules, incorporate existing international envi- 
ronmental agreements and negotiate new ones, monitor compliance, and settle 
disputes over environmental policies-in  the same way that the GATT has pre- 
sided over trade rules and policies for the past five decades (Esty 1994). And 
just as the GATTNTO strengthens the capacity of  governments to resist the 
demands of domestic vested interest groups seeking higher import taxes, so a 
WE0 may help governments resist interest group demands to set low environ- 
mental standards (Deardorff 1995). The advantage of a WE0  for traders, Esty 
has argued, is that it could redirect  environmentalists’ attention away  from 
trade policies and toward ensuring the implementation of more efficient policy 
instruments for achieving environmental objectives, allowing both sets of poli- 
cies to contribute more effectively toward the common goals of  sustainable 
development and improvement in the quality  of  life. Even so, the issue of 
whether the WTO or the WE0 would have precedence would need to be re- 
solved. It is noteworthy that the side agreement to NAFTA gives a surprising 
(to me, given that it is a trade agreement) degree of precedence to environmen- 
tal concerns relative to trade concerns. What needs to be recognized is that 
where the two are in conflict, achieving the optimal welfare-maximizing out- 
come requires both to compromise somewhat. 
Thus without doubt the trade policy community needs to be involved in 
negotiating multilateral environmental agreements that are likely to include 
trade provisions, and to develop criteria by which WTO members could assess 
in advance the extent to which trade restrictions within such agreements are 
acceptable. Some of the relevant criteria were enunciated at UNCED. It is im- 
portant, first, to ensure that trade provisions are strictly necessary and effective 
in achieving the environmental objectives involved. For the reasons outlined 
earlier, there will often be an alternative, more effective instrument than trade 
restrictions. Where trade instruments are required in the absence of  superior 
policy  measures, they  should be used only in proportion  to the size of  the 
associated  environmental  problem  and  should be  the  least trade-restrictive 
measure available. The measures ought to be transparent  and not be protec- 
tionist  in  impact  and  where  possible  should  be  consistent  with  both  the 
GATT  principles  of  nondiscrimination  (most  favored  nation  and  national 
treatment) and the key environmental principles such as the polluter pays and 
the  precautionary  principles.  If  those  conditions are met,  WTO  members 
would be unlikely to object to the use of trade measures in multilateral environ- 
mental agreements (witness the absence of  objections by  GATT contracting 
parties to the trade provisions in the Montreal Protocol and the CITES). Hence, 
even the possible need to use trade provisions in multilateral environmental 
agreements does not provide sufficient reason to amend GATT Article 20 to 
allow in the list of exceptions the use of trade measures for environmental pro- 
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3.6  The GATT/WTO and Labor Standards 
An even more questionable entrant onto the WTO’s potential agenda than 
the environment, and one that has an even clearer North-South dimension, is 
the issue of labor standards (Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994). Government or labor 
union actions in setting minimum labor standards are often considered neces- 
sary to reduce the risk of exploitation of (particularly low-skilled) workers by 
capitalists. As with environmental standards, labor standards differ between 
countries and tend to be lower or enforced less in developing countries. The 
direct effect of  such things as shorter working weeks, higher overtime pay, 
longer annual leave, and safer and healthier working conditions may be to raise 
worker welfare, but they also raise the cost of employing labor-otherwise 
they would have been adopted voluntarily and so there would be no need for 
government or union action.I5  They are therefore similar to other taxes on pro- 
duction that differ across industries in that their indirect effects need to be 
considered as well (Ehrenberg 1994). Specifically, they effectively make (par- 
ticularly low-skilled) labor scarcer. That tends to raise the cost of  production 
in labor-intensive industries most in high-standard countries, thereby reducing 
the capacity of  those industries to compete with producers in low-standard 
countries while enhancing the capacity of other industries to so compete, along 
Rybczynski (1959) lines. 
The owners of firms in harmed industries can respond to demands for higher 
labor standards by lobbying against their imposition or by demanding protec- 
tion from imports from lower-standard countries until standards in the latter 
are raised. Thus one country’s choice of  standards is not independent of  the 
choices of other countries, nor is the country’s trade policy independent of that 
relationship. As with environmental standards, the demand for unilateral use 
of trade policy for this reason has grown over time with the internationalization 
of the global economy: the decline in traditional trade barriers has ensured that 
any given cost-raising standard is becoming relatively more important as a 
determinant of  international competitiveness, and the deregulation of  direct 
foreign investment abroad has increased the possibilities for firms to relocate 
their factories from high- to lower-standard countries. 
To what extent is there a parallel claim with the environment issue for plac- 
ing labor standards on the WTO’s agenda because of international spillovers? 
Many economists would say there is none, because they perceive no physical 
spillovers of the global-warming or ozone-depleting kind. At least one minor 
spillover may be present at some times and in some places though. It is the 
effect of  high standards for low-skilled workers in  attracting unwanted mi- 
grants from less developed economies across borders that may be difficult to 
15. So-called  neoinstitutionalists  argue that higher  labor  standards would raise worker pro- 
ductivity (see, e.g., Hanson  1983, 53-63),  but it is reasonable to assume that firms will  have 
already recognized any such possibilities and incorporated them into their work practices. If not, 
the first-best role for government is to subsidize the provision of information about those opportu- 
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police.  I6  Furthermore,  there is the possibility  also of  psychological  interna- 
tional spillovers. People may grieve because of abuse of  what they perceive 
as worker rights or poor working conditions abroad just as they may for low 
environmental standards or abuse of human rights generally. But, again as with 
the environment, while that may provide justification for action of sume sort at 
the international level, there are very few circumstances in which multilateral 
trade measures are worthy of consideration as sticks or carrots for encouraging 
other countries to raise their standards. One is in cases where, as happened in 
the NAFTA negotiations, there comes a point when significant negotiating par- 
ties refuse to enter further multilateral trade negotiations unless labor standards 
are on the agenda. Should that happen, a judgment would have to be made by 
the other negotiating parties as to whether it would be worth continuing under 
such a condition. Another is when aggrieved high-standard countries can find 
no lower-cost ways to influence the policies of lower-standard countries, but 
even there the psychological benefits to the North may be insufficient to war- 
rant the costs to consumers and exporters in the high-standard countries (not 
to mention the net costs to the affected low-standard countries). And a third 
possible circumstance is when there might otherwise be a reluctance to raise 
one’s own national standards so as not to erode the competitiveness of those 
domestic industries harmed by an increase in the gap between labor standards 
at home and abroad. 
The concern in high-standard countries ostensibly is not so much the aver- 
age wage level difference but rather  such things as occupational health and 
safety standards, worker rights to form unions and seek a minimum wage level 
and other improved conditions of  employment, the use of child or prison or 
forced labor, and the derogation from national labor laws in export-processing 
zones. The United States and France, for example, were at pains to make clear 
at Marrakesh that their push for the WTO to consider tradeflabor issues was 
very much focused on differences in labor standards other than wages. Human 
rights activists and development nongovernmental agencies often add support 
to union calls for higher standards in developing countries, believing that they 
would improve the quality of life there-even  though in fact the raising of 
labor standards in the formal sector is more likely simply to drive employment 
into the informal sector (where labor standards are even lower) or to lengthen 
the queues of unemployed people seeking high-paid, high-standard formal sec- 
tor jobs.” In the case of young women displaced from their jobs by  higher 
labor standards, they may to have to marry and bear children earlier than other- 
wise, or even to enter prostitution, in order to survive.I8 
16. My thanks go to David Richardson for offering this suggestion. Needless to say, the first- 
best response to such a possibility may be to adopt measures to reduce illegal immigration. 
17. This could easily be shown using a Harris-Todaro type of model as modified, e.g.,  by Corden 
and Findlay (1975). The consequences of raising labor standards in  a multigood, multicountry 
world  can  be  quite  complex  and  sometimes  counterintuitive,  depending  on  the  assumptions 
adopted. See the excellent theoretical analysis of  several possibilities by  Brown, Deardorff, and 
Stem (1996). 
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As with environmental standards, traditional  protectionist  forces in high- 
income countries are prompt to support any such calls for import restraint by 
high-standard  countries against goods from lower-standard countries. They 
sometimes bolster their case by quoting simple trade theory (the factor price 
equalization and Stolper-Samuelson theorems) in support of  their argument 
that liberal trade leads to factor price convergence and in particular to a drop 
in low-skill wages in high-wage countries-even  though those theorems have 
been shown to be not very robust when more than two countries, goods, and 
factors are involved (Falvey 1995) and are not supported by empirical simula- 
tion results of trade liberalizations such as the Uruguay Round.I9  There is also 
a risk that support for openness in low-standard countries could come under 
challenge if those who lose from the forced raising of those standards lobby 
domestically against their country’s exposure to other societies through having 
a liberal trade regime. 
The International Labour Organisation (LO) has been writing labor stan- 
dards for 75 years. Why has this issue suddenly become entangled with the 
GATTWTO and trade policy issues? In fact, the entwining of trade and labor 
standards is not new,zo  but it raises its head mainly when the trading system is 
in the news and particularly if labor markets are in trouble at the time. It be- 
came an issue when the International Trade Organization was being conceived 
in 1947,2’  and again at the end of the Tokyo Round, and now once more as the 
WTO establishes itself and the Uruguay Round starts to be implemented at a 
time of poor labor market performance in industrial countries (with unemploy- 
ment above 10 percent in Europe and relative earnings of unskilled labor in 
the United States deteriorating). 
Over time, though, the issue is coming under increasing discussion. This is 
partly for the reason mentioned earlier of declining trade and investment barri- 
ers, which mean that cost-raising standards become relatively more important 
as determinants of international competitiveness and plant location. But a fur- 
ther  implication  of  falling  communication  costs  is that  citizens  of  high- 
standard countries are increasingly able to get information on labor (and envi- 
19. In their recent simulation work, Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1995) found real 
wages in all country groups to increase as a result of implementing the Uruguay Round. Using a 
similar global computable general equilibrium model, Qers  and Yang (1995) found through both 
backcasting and projecting forward that expanding imports from Asia do contribute to wage dis- 
persion and possibly lower real wages or increased unemployment in the United States and Euro- 
pean Union, although only to a minor extent. Significantly, they also found that restricting imports 
from Asia would be an ineffective response since its impact through contracting the global econ- 
omy is to lower real rewards to all types of  labor in industrial countries. 
20. The history is patchy but goes back more than a hundred years (Hanson 1983, 11; Chamovitz 
1987). The text of the GATT itself mentions labor only briefly,  in Article 20(e), which allows 
contracting parties to exclude imports of goods produced with prison labor. 
21. Article 7 of Chapter II of the 1948 (Havana) Charter of the International Trade Organization 
addresses the issue as follows: “The members recognise that unfair labour conditions, particularly 
in the production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and accordingly, each mem- 
ber shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within 
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ronmental) standards in other countries. That, together with the ever greater 
sense of  integration among the world’s  people  (the “global village”  idea), 
allows and encourages the concern for human rights to spread beyond national 
boundaries, a tendency that might therefore be expected to continue indefi- 
nitely as global economic growth and integration proceed. Around that upward 
trend in concern will be fluctuations that are opposite to the business cycle: the 
worse the labor market is performing in high-wage countries (especially in the 
lower-skill categories), the more likely it is that imports from low-wage coun- 
tries will be blamed22-notwithstanding  clear evidence that such imports are 
at most only a very minor contributor (Lawrence 1994; Burtless 1995; Tyers 
and Yang 1995).  And that likelihood is exacerbated by the computer and infor- 
mation revolutions that, together with other forces, are increasing the demand 
for skilled relative to unskilled workers (Wood 1994). 
Another reason why the labor issue has become more prominent in the mul- 
tilateral trade arena once again is that it has succeeded recently in penetrating 
regional integration agreements. Specifically, a Protocol on Social Policy was 
annexed to the Treaty of  Maastricht signed by  EU  member governments in 
February  1992 (Sapir  1996). As  well,  labor became the  subject of  a side 
agreement to NAFTA in 1993-a  price President Clinton paid to buy off oppo- 
sition from labor groups to NAFTA’s passage through the U.S. Congress. Hav- 
ing been encouraged by  their success in those regional economic integration 
settings, and before that in some minor trade and investment agreements in 
the 1980s (see Lawrence 1994 for details), the advocates of that NAFTA side 
agreement are now, like the environmental lobby groups, seeking to have an 
influence at the multilateral trade level. In  both situations, the desire of  the 
GATT’s contracting parties to conclude, ratify, and implement the Uruguay 
Round agreements on trade liberalization was to a considerable extent simply 
being used opportunistically by  these groups to further their own causes, de- 
spite the tenuous connections of those causes with trade. Their relative success 
to date is in  large part due to the superficial popular appeal of  their causes, 
while the downside in terms of the potential risk to the global trading system 
is far from obvious to the layperson. 
To conclude this section, it is instructive to examine the progress of  labor 
policies in the subglobal arena of the European Union. A recent assessment by 
Sapir (1996) has concluded that in Europe there have  always been optimists 
who believe economic integration breeds greater economic growth and equal- 
ity of social policies (led by the Ohlin Report to the ILO at the tie of the forma- 
tion of the European Economic Community-see  ILO 1956) and pessimists 
who believe upward harmonization needs to be imposed on lower-standard 
countries to improve citizens’ conditions there and to avoid “social dumping” 
though trade. In practice, relatively little has been imposed effectively on the 
22. This is the opposite to the case of the environment, concerns for which tend to fluctuate pro- 
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poorer  member  countries  of  the  European  Union;  the  most  that  has  been 
agreed to is the adoption of some minimum standards and mutual recognition. 
Yet standards have risen rapidly with the acceleration of income growth in the 
poorer EU countries. Where standards have risen even faster than normal they 
have been accompanied by  large “economic and social cohesion” payments 
from Brussels. However, since explicit side payments are not as readily avail- 
able at the multilateral  level, and since the  number and diversity  of  lower- 
standard countries is far greater globally than within the European Union, the 
likelihood of major action through the WTO (much less the ILO or a WEO) 
seems slight. 
3.7  What Could and Should Developing Countries and APEC Do 
about These Developments? 
The demands for greater harmonization of  domestic policies for competi- 
tiveness reasons, coupled with the greening of world politics and the growing 
interest in worker and other human rights beyond national borders, are likely 
to put the WTO and trade policy under pressure to perform tasks for which 
they were not designed and to which they are not well suited-and  at a time 
when the WTO needs first to consolidate its role in the world and ensure the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round before moving into these more thorny 
issues that are only peripherally connected with trade.23 
The pressure on the WTO to become more entwined with issues of environ- 
mental and labor standards is and should be of considerable concern to devel- 
oping  countries.  The reason  is  not  so much  that  the  imposition  of  higher 
standards  themselves  would  be  costly  to  them.  In  fact,  middle-income, 
midstandard  countries  may  well  be  net  beneficiaries  if  low-income,  low- 
standard countries were required  to raise their standards more than them  to 
reach  minimum  acceptable  levels.  Even  the negative  direct  effect for low- 
income economies of having to raise their standards could be offset somewhat, 
at least for the most labor-abundant poor countries, by a terms-of-trade im- 
provement if many countries were to raise their labor standards multilaterally 
and if that reduced the global supply of low-skilled labor time. Nonetheless, 
people in developing countries are suspicious of the motives of OECD coun- 
tries and object to what they perceive  as social imperialism and a denial of 
their national sovereignty. 
While they are not being targeted per se, the fact is that such standards tend 
23. The suggestion has been made, e.g., that the WTO become active in monitoring and enforc- 
ing agreed minimum social standards. That presumably would involve the review of environmental 
and labor standards as part of the GATTNTO regular Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs). Given that 
the WTO’s TPR mechanism is already stretched to its limit in covering even the major trade poli- 
cies of contracting parties, such an addition to its workload would require a very  substantial addi- 
tion to its resources-not  to mention the extra burden on those employed in national capitals when 
the reviews are under way. An even greater potential increase in workload would result for the 
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to be applied less in developing countries because they are poorer. That, to- 
gether  with  the fact  that  their  comparative  advantages  often  are  in  labor-, 
natural-resource-, and pollution-intensive industries, means those countries are 
vulnerable either to being pressured to enforce stricter standards or to facing 
less market access for their exports to stricter-standard countries. Furthermore, 
should the use of trade policy to try to harmonize  standards upward lead to 
trade retaliation and counterretaliation, the end result could be a weakening of 
the multilateral trading system on which developing countries are coming to 
depend increasingly as they liberalize their economies.  One possible conse- 
quence is that developing countries could seek refuge from antidumping (eco 
or social) duties via association  with or accession to the European Union or 
NAFTA, where they might expect to receive greater compensation for raising 
their social standards. In such cases, any net gain they might enjoy could well 
be at the expense of excluded developing countries. 
However, since the entwining of these social issues with trade policy is more 
likely  to tighten  than  to disentangle  in  the foreseeable  future, the question 
arises as to how developing countries and forums such as the Asia Pacific Eco- 
nomic Cooperation (APEC) ought to respond. One response is to point out that 
industrial countries had lower standards at earlier stages of development and 
that,  since developing  countries have contributed  a disproportionately  small 
amount per capita to global environmental problems such as the greenhouse 
effect, they should be compensated for contributing to their solutions rather 
than have that contribution demanded of them under threats of trade sanctions. 
Compensation would be even more justified in cases where industrial countries 
are demanding responses by other countries to reduce the psychological inter- 
national spillovers mentioned earlier. 
Another response by developing countries is to disseminate more widely the 
sound arguments for not using trade-restrictive  measures to achieve environ- 
mental or labor objectives: that differences in standards are a legitimate source 
of comparative advantage insofar as they reflect differences in resource endow- 
ments and societies’ preferences and abilities to afford the good things in life; 
that standards rise with per capita income and liberal trade promotes income 
growth; that theory and empirical evidence provide little reason to expect that 
differences in standards contribute significantly to differences in costs of pro- 
duction and hence to trade and investment patterns, nor that downward harmo- 
nization of standards (a “race to the bottom”) is occurring;24  that if freer trade 
were to worsen welfare of, say, low-skilled workers, adjustment assistance pro- 
grams such as retraining subsidies provide much cheaper solutions than trade 
restrictions, as do nontrade measures such as labeling (“dolphin-friendly tuna” 
or “made with unionized labor”) that allow consumers to exercise their prefer- 
24. Surveys of the relevant theory can be found in  Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996), Wilson 
(1996). and Brown  et al. (1996). For empirical evidence, see, e.g., Tobey (1990), Low (1992), 
Jaffe et al. (1995). and Levinson (1996) on environmental standards and Krugman and Lawrence 
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ences through the market; that the GATT rules-based multilateral trading sys- 
tem is threatened by the risk that environmental or labor groups will be cap- 
tured by traditional protectionist groups in high-standard countries, and by  the 
risk that resulting trade restrictions and pressure to involuntarily raise stan- 
dards will be used by protectionist groups in lower-standard countries to argue 
against their countries’ export-oriented development strategies. 
Helpful though such argumentation could be, more dialogue and compro- 
mise between high-income and developing countries is likely to be needed. 
One suggestion is the following. If developing countries were to commit them- 
selves to enforcing minimum standards and to raising those standards over 
time according to a specified schedule, in return for gradual improvements in 
OECD market access, vocal interest groups in high-income countries would be 
less able to deny that improvements in social standards are positively related 
to income and trade growth. That would be using trade policy as a carrot rather 
than a stick. Likewise, if developing countries were seen to be enforcing rea- 
sonable standards especially effectively on their foreign investors, concerns 
about capital outflows to “pollution havens” or “cheap labor havens” and the 
consequent loss of jobs in  high-standard countries would be less justifiable. 
Alternatively or additionally, developing countries could transfer the onus back 
to high-standard countries to insist that their firms accede to the same high 
standards when they invest in developing countries as in more advanced econo- 
mies. And anxiety over deforestation could be reduced if developing countries 
were able to demonstrate that they can police restrictions on felling and are 
prepared to do so in return for adequate compensation in the form of greater 
access to OECD markets or aid (e.g., via the UNDP/UNEP/World Bank Global 
Environment Facility administered by the World Bank). 
A more controversial suggestion has been made by  Rodrik (1994). He be- 
lieves a case can be made for high-standard countries to take action against a 
trading partner if trade with that country violates a widely held social standard 
(i.e., one that is accepted by export and consumer interests in those countries in 
addition to aggrieved import-competing producers and environmental or labor 
groups). The case rests on the point that an erosion of confidence in the “fair- 
ness” of the trading system may ultimately be more costly to the world econ- 
omy than the action against the offending trading partner. He suggests that the 
Safeguards Agreement of  the Uruguay Round could be broadened to allow a 
“Social Safeguards” clause whereby in such cases a country could restrict the 
offending imports and compensate the trading partner. Rodrik recognizes that 
this could do more harm than good (not least because it would formalize a link 
between trade policy and social standards). Even so, he argues that its merits 
need to be weighed against the other options available to developing countries 
to minimize the damage from the encroachment of  social issues into the trade 
policy domain. The sobering history of abuse of the GATT’s other safeguards 
clauses, though (see Finger 1995), leaves little room for enthusiasm for this 
proposal to amend the Uruguay Round‘s Agreement on Subsidies and Counter- 
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Finally, what about the role of APEC? Since a complete decoupling of social 
issues from trade policy seems unlikely  in the foreseeable future, it is im- 
portant for developing countries to consider what principles ought to govern 
the design of trade policies and trade-related environmental and labor policies 
to ensure equitable and sustainable  development. Several have been mentioned 
above in passing. Even if developing countries were simply to discuss such 
a list with higher-standard countries, the resulting dialogue may itself be pro- 
ductive in diffusing some of  the  concerns expressed by  environmental and 
labor groups (Zarsky and Drake-Brockman  1994). APEC,  with its diffuse 
but relatively small membership, provides an obvious forum for such dis- 
cussion before the much larger WTO membership debates the issues. In the 
same spirit, APEC might also begin to monitor trade-related  environmental 
measures as part of its overall compilation of trade impediments in the Asia 
Pacific. As well, it might actively seek, as a priority in its trade facilitation and 
liberalization initiatives launched at Bogor in November 1994, the removal 
of  trade policies  that incidentally  harm  the environment-again,  providing 
a regional example for what might eventually be achievable globally through 
the WTO. 
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Comment  Menzie D. Chinn 
Review of Main Conclusions 
In this paper, Kym Anderson asks three key questions. “Why are social pol- 
icy differences becoming more important in disputes between countries? Un- 
der what circumstances (if any) is trade policy an appropriate instrument for 
resolving such disputes? What are the implications for the global trading sys- 
tem, for regional trading arrangements, and their interaction?’ Briefly put, the 
answers are respectively  (1) because other formal trade barriers are low, (2) 
almost never, and (3)  in general bad. 
In addressing these issues, the paper provides an excellent overview of the 
rising prominence  of  social issues in  debates  surrounding trade  policy  and 
makes a series of cogent arguments dispelling several myths about trade, the 
environment, and growth. Anderson has done us an important service, exactly 
because there is a lot of misunderstanding about such issues. 
Take for instance the recent NAFTA debate. Both labor standards and envi- 
ronmental concerns figured prominently in the negotiations and in the domes- 
tic political debate; I know that among my noneconomist, but educated friends, 
the issue of alleged labor repression and lax environmental regulations in Mex- 
ico was sufficient reason to oppose NAFTA. The same could also be said, with 
somewhat less force, about the GATTNTO. Since what people think is almost 
as important as what is the case, clear reasoning is at a premium. 
Let me first recount what I take as several key points made in the paper and 
then add my observations. 
First, Anderson points to the very success of the GATT as a partial explana- 
tion for the rising prominence of social standards-as  the level of tariff protec- 
tion has fallen, the presence of nontariff  barriers  (NTBs) has become more 
apparent. However, these NTBs are social standards that (perhaps) are not in- 
tended to impede trade. Moreover, environmental concerns are following a sec- 
ular upward trend because the process of environmental degradation seems to 
be more concrete than in past decades. Hence, there are increased spillovers of 
both a physical  and a psychological nature (although I suspect most econo- 
mists would be a bit queasy with the latter concept). 
The second major point, and one that few of us would dispute, is that trade 
policy measures are usually not first-best instruments for addressing distor- 
tions. If pollution is a problem, then a tariff is an extremely blunt, and perhaps 
counterproductive, instrument to use in affecting behavior (see the discussion 
in Beghin, Roland-Holst, and Mensbrugghe 1994). 
Third, unilateral  trade measures are a bad idea, in the sense that they can 
be coopted by interest groups, lead to escalation and retaliation, or erode the 
multilateral trade regime by giving false credibility to the trade-development 
versus environmental-protection dichotomy. 
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Last, Anderson argues for a reasonable policy of  education and of limited 
compromise. This first endeavor appeals to the idea that enlightened people 
will “do the right thing.” The latter is a pragmatic response, which seeks to 
defuse environmental or labor activist concerns via a “demonstration effect”-- 
if  growing less developed countries adopt minimum labor standards, devel- 
oped country electorates will see that standards do rise with income. 
I cannot say that I disagree with any of the conclusions that are drawn in the 
paper, so let me make some observations regarding how Anderson’s analysis 
relates to the Asia Pacific region. 
Social Policies and Regionalism 
First, it is interesting to recall that over two decades ago, Richard Cooper 
(1976) noted that the logic of regional economic integration had to be rooted 
in the presence of collective or public goods because the optimal area for the 
integration of trade in the private goods market was the world. (Ignore for the 
sake of  argument recent caveats about the optimal size of  free trade areas.) 
While regionalism in the Asia Pacific region has up until now taken the form of 
increasing linkages in trade and capital flows, the increase in levels of pollution 
potentially gives rise to another rationale for regionalism. 
China is a major producer of  air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, carbon 
monoxide, and suspended particulates, which are involved in the formation of 
acid rain. In  1990 China produced a staggering 20 million tons of sulfur diox- 
ide (UN Environmental Program 1994). Japan, which in comparison produced 
only 1.1 million tons, was the most visible victim of the resulting acid rain. I 
am not as sanguine as Anderson that all the spillover from such transborder 
pollution can be dealt with by bilateral agreements between affected parties. 
This is a clear case of domestic policies having externalities for other coun- 
tries. The air pollution largely is caused by inefficient energy production and 
consumption. China has a producer subsidy for coal of about 20 percent and a 
consumer subsidy for electricity of  60 percent. The argument could be ex- 
tended to other types of pollution. For instance, soil degradation or erosion and 
consequent water pollution can be ascribed to overuse of irrigated water. China 
shows up here again, with an 80 percent consumer subsidy, but so too do the 
Philippines (80 percent) and Indonesia (90 percent; figures from World Bank 
1992,69). One could easily expand this list to encompass other concerns. 
I mentioned that all this was a potential rationale for regionalism. Cooper 
argued that another impetus for regional grouping would be similarity in pref- 
erences among member states for clean air and water. This makes both the 
desirability and feasibility of  regionalism much less definite, given the wide 
disparity in levels of economic development in the East Asian area (let alone 
the APEC region). For similar reasons, labor standards appear to be an even 
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Capital Market Integration 
A second interesting issue, but only alluded to, is the role of increasing capi- 
tal mobility in fostering concerns about social standards. For Americans, this 
concern is embodied  in Ross Perot’s prediction  of American jobs going to 
Mexico in the wake of NAFTA. This view holds that hot-footed capital in the 
form of direct investment can easily, and will readily, relocate manufacturing 
facilities in search of laxer environmental and labor standards. 
The dire predictions of NAFTA opponents did not come to pass (although 
the collapse  of  the peso means  that  a  controlled  experiment  was  not  per- 
formed). Moreover, the statistical evidence for a relocation effect due to envi- 
ronmental regulations is scant (see the recent survey by Jaffe et al. 1995).  The 
elusiveness of the relationship could be explained by the relatively small mag- 
nitude of pollution  abatement costs, less than 2 percent  of value added for 
U.S.  industry. 
Even with the reductions of  capital controls, as long as uncertainty about 
the future tax liabilities of foreign investment remains-ranging  from future 
emplacement of environmental controls to expropriation-mobility  of physi- 
cal capital is likely to remain substantially less than infinite. 
Is the Multilateral Approach a Viable Alternative? 
Anderson makes  an appeal for more education-essentially  the idea that 
one can win the day by the sheer weight of studies and clear reasoning and that 
educated electorates will then select instruments that directly address the is- 
sues of concern. However, while economists find the concept of first-best solu- 
tions a powerful one, I am,  like the author, not too sanguine about the prospects 
for education alone to carry the day. 
It seems to me that a more aggressive approach to the environmental issue 
could be pursued in the multilateral agencies. Not only could greater access to 
the Global Environmental Facility be used as a carrot. The World Bank could 
push even harder for removing those distortions that have environmental impli- 
cations. For instance, lending for the electricity sector could be made condi- 
tional on even greater rationalization of energy prices than heretofore. In many 
instances,  liberalizing  regulations  and  eliminating  subsidies  are  consonant 
with better environmental conditions. 
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Comment  Chong-Hyun  am 
Anderson’s paper is an excellent survey of the controversial and complex issue 
of environmental and labor standards in relation to trade policy. The paper tries 
to be rather unprejudiced in addressing these sensitive issues by examining all 
the important arguments related to the subject. 
I have three comments. First, it appears that the issue of environmental stan- 
dards can best be addressed as an externality problem, if one wants to analyze 
it in terms of  economics. In that case, economic theory suggests that exter- 
nality problems can be cured most effectively by internalizing external costs 
through, for example, tax-cum-subsidy  schemes aimed at the root  cause of 
the problem. 
Suppose there is an environmental problem without an international spillo- 
ver effect. Then an important question is whether one can measure the exter- 
nality associated with that environmental problem well enough that a detailed 
tax-cum-subsidy program can be applied. If  one can, then an essentially do- 
mestic environmental problem can largely be resolved in an optimal way. If 
not, however, there would be a lot of problems. 
In general, as Anderson suggests, the benefits from an improved environ- 
ment tend to increase as people’s incomes rise. For that reason, rich countries 
tend to have tighter environmental standards than do poor countries. Therefore, 
differences in environmental standards across countries are a quite natural out- 
come that correctly reflect the production and consumption conditions of a 
particular product in a particular country. It is, therefore, very dangerous for 
advanced countries to attempt to apply their own environmental standards to 
developing countries. Developing countries would thus be justified in arguing 
that differentiated environmental standards are needed if one wants to be fair 
about the issue. 
Suppose now that the environment-induced externalities have international 
spillover effects across neighboring countries or on a global scale. A multilat- 
eral regime would certainly be required to deal with such a complicated prob- 
lem. The key issue is again how to determine who is going to bear the external 
costs and how much. One approach would be to establish an international body 
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such as a World Environmental Organization, mainly to set the rules, negotiate 
multilateral agreements, and settle disputes over spillover effects across coun- 
tries, in much the way the GATT has done for trade over the past half-century. 
My second comment addresses what the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
can do regarding environmental standards. First of all, the WTO can emphasize 
that trade policy cannot solve the complex issue of environmental externalities 
and thus cannot be used as an instrument to enforce environmental standards, 
except in extreme cases where no other policy measure is available and, of 
course, following a multilateral consensus even in those cases. The WTO can 
also oversee or monitor an individual country’s environmental policy so as to 
prevent abuses of trade policy in the name of environmental protection. In this 
regard, I think, it would be very useful if Anderson could document and pro- 
vide some quantitative evidence of the economic costs involved in cases where 
trade policy was misused in the name of environmental protection. Even one 
such example would suffice to warn policymakers  about how much such a 
trade policy can hurt an economy without improving environmental condi- 
tions. 
Finally, my comment on labor standards will be brief since this issue entails 
no externality argument, and hence there is no international spillover effect of 
externalities associated with labor standards. By that, however, I do not mean 
that there is no case for governmental involvement with labor standards. Gov- 
ernmental interest in such areas as health and safety standards, the right of 
workers to form unions, and the use of child or prison labor is evident, but 
these concerns are basically motivated by humanitarian or educational desires 
and would be more effectively handled by the International Labour Organisa- 
tion than by the WTO. However, I think it might be desirable for the WTO to 
be equipped with  some kind of  safeguard mechanism  against any possible 
abuse of trade policy in the name of labor standards. This Page Intentionally Left Blank